





SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AS A DEVELOPMENT
OPPORTUNITY:  THE ROLE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION*
By K.C. Fung and Alan Siu
Introduction
Service trade liberalization is one of the most important areas of negotiations in the
Doha agenda.  Given the complexities involved in this topic, it is safe to assume that
service liberalization will remain an important negotiation and research topic beyond the
completion  of  the  Doha  Round,  which  at  this  moment  is  indefinitely  suspended.    The
“concession demanders” in the area of service trade liberalization are the rich, industrialized
countries; partly because of this fact, trade liberalization in services is almost universally
believed to be against the trade interests of the developing countries.  To some degree,
this belief is justified, but only in a technical, negotiation sense.
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It is widely known that the other major areas of negotiations for the Doha Round of
trade talks are cuts in agricultural subsidies and protection as well as the reduction of
industrial tariffs.  The implicit “grand bargain” is for industrialized countries such as the
United States, France and other European Union members to provide deep cuts in subsidies
and protection in the agriculture sector and, in return, developing countries such as Brazil
and India will open up their service industries (Financial Times, 2005).  This highlights the
view that at the general political level, the implicit negotiation linkage for developing countries
is to give up service sector and industrial sector protection in exchange for agricultural
sector liberalization in the industrialized economies.
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However,  while  this  grand  vision  of  a  comprehensive  exchange  of  concessions
implies that developing countries lose from giving up too much in service liberalization,
there are many reasons to believe that even without significant reciprocal concessions in
return, developing countries may well benefit from their own liberalization of their service
sectors.    Service  industries,  such  as  finance,  act  as  important  intermediates  for  other
* This project is partly supported by a grant from the University Grants Committee, Hong Kong,
China (Project No. AoE/H-05/99).
1 Negotiation interests and unilateral economic interests can be quite different.  For a discussion of
this aspect, see K.C. Fung and others, 2005.
2 In some cases, the service sectors of some developing countries may be too small to be considered
significant reciprocal concessions.  However, these concessions can be seen as long-term gains for
the industrialized countries.  As developing economies grow, their service sectors will expand.  The
concessions in the service sectors are locked in.68
sectors.    Their  liberalization  (together  with  judicious  regulations  and  monitoring)  can
significantly  improve  the  productivity  of  other  industries  in  the  economy.    Indeed,  the
malfunctioning of certain service industries can create economic chaos, as was clearly
highlighted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Intellectually, at least in the Asia-Pacific region, the idea that service liberalization
can enhance economic development is not totally alien.  Given the painful experience of
the Asian financial crisis, and the decade-long slow growth in Japan that was at least
partly induced by its banking problems, many policymakers are aware of the need to carry
out reforms and liberalization in the financial sector.  So why is it so difficult to accept
service sector liberalization, even though such a policy is expected to foster economic
development?  For anyone who has any practical policy experience, the answer, at least in
part, lies in the political economy of such liberalization.  Service trade liberalization has
winners and losers.  The losers will always attempt to block these policies.  Some of the
existing domestic regulations exist because of such lobbying in the first place.
Section A of this chapter discusses service trade liberalization as an opportunity for
economic development.  This discussion is couched in the context of the literature on the
so-called East Asian miracle or, from another viewpoint, the literature on the myth of the
East Asian miracle.  Section B argues that in order to realize this opportunity, it is necessary
to understand fully the political economy of such liberalization.  A particular approach is
taken and a political economy model of service trade restrictions is created.  The model is
then  used  to  highlight  what  can  be  done  to  relax  the  political-economic  constraints  in
order to further service trade liberalization and thus economic development.  In particular,
the  role  of  WTO  in  fostering  such  liberalization,  and  thus  development,  is  highlighted.
Section  C  discusses  the  growth-accounting  literature  as  applied  to  East  Asia  and
Southeast Asia, examines the role of services in creating further economic growth, and
then  focuses  on  the  political  difficulty  and  potential  solutions  to  fostering  service  trade
liberalization.  Section D provides an overview of the discussion.
A.  Economic growth and service trade liberalization
In a very simple sense, the growth-accounting literature proposes that there exists
an economy-wide production function, linking aggregate output to its inputs such as labour
and capital.
3 Translating output levels into growth rates of outputs, the growth rate of an
economy can easily be translated to the growth rates of its inputs, plus a residual that
researchers attribute to technical progress.  Using an extremely simplified example, it can





3 Some of the materials used in this section are taken from K.C. Fung, 2006.
4 The aggregate production function does not need to be Cobb-Douglas, which is used here as an
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where Y is the aggregate output, A is the level of technology, K is capital, L is labour and
“a” is the national income share of capital owners.  It is clear that economic growth of
output can be decomposed into the growth of the inputs and the change of the state of
technology:
dY/Y = dA/A + a(dK/K) + (1-a) (dL/L) (2)
Technical progress can be measured as the “Solow residual”, or the residual from
the difference between growth of output and growth of inputs.  The analysis can be made
more complex by incorporating human capital or intangible capital (such as research and
development spending) as a third or fourth input.  However, the essential analysis remains
the same.
Empirically,  there  has  been  a  very  lively  debate  among  prominent  researchers
such  as Young  (1995),  Lau  and  Park  (2003),  Krugman  (1994)  and  Hsieh  (2002),  who
applied this growth-accounting framework to the case of East Asia and Southeast Asia.  To
summarize their findings, they found that there had been no technical progress in China,
the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) and the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand) prior to 1985.  There was some evidence that after 1985, in
the case of most of the Asian economies studied, there was some technical progress.
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Tables 1 and 2 highlight some results from this literature.
Tables 1 and 2 show that after 1985, even if human capital is included as an input,
most Asian economies (except China and the Philippines) exhibited some technical progress.
Naturally, Japan has always been an exception.  Its growth is propelled by a sizeable
degree of technical progress, both before and after 1985.
Table 1.  Sources of economic growth in East Asia and Southeast Asia, pre-1985
Country/area Physical capital Labour Technical progress
Hong Kong, China 74.61 25.39 0.00
Republic of Korea 82.95 17.05 0.00
Singapore 63.41 36.59 0.00
Taiwan Province of China 86.60 13.40 0.00
Indonesia 88.79 11.21 0.00
Malaysia 66.68 33.32 0.00
Philippines 66.10 33.90 0.00
Thailand 83.73 16.27 0.00
China 94.84 5.16 0.00
Japan 55.01 3.70 41.29
Source: Lau and Park, 2003.
5 Using different data, some technical progress for selective economies was found by Chang-Tai
Hsieh, 2002.70
However, even if research and development spending is included as an additional
input, the researchers found that there had been no technical progress for East Asian and
Southeast  Asian  economies,  pre-  or  post-1985.
6 Thus, economic growth in much of
post-1985 Asia can be attributed to human capital, and research and development spending.
These observations about the sources of economic growth do not imply the absence of
sizeable  technical  progress  at  a  sectoral  level  (e.g.,  Korean  cell  phones  or Taiwanese
laptop manufacturing).  However, for the economy as a whole, technical progress did not
show up in growth accounting.  In general terms, therefore, before 1985 economic growth
in Asia was due exclusively to growth in traditional inputs (physical capital and labour).
After 1985, some growth was propelled by non-traditional inputs such as human capital,
and research and development.
At the policy level, it appears that Asian and other developing economies should
continue  to  invest  in  education  (to  enhance  human  capital)  and  increase  spending  on
research  and  development.    The  problems  with  these  sources  of  growth  are  two-fold.
First, they are costly, particularly spending on research.  Second, the results may take
a long time to realize.  Despite these problems, in the longer term there are no good
alternatives to making investments in intangible capital and human capital.
Service sector liberalization can be a complementary policy to investment in these
other forms of capital.  Service sectors such as finance, distribution, logistics, transport
and telecommunications act like infrastructure and lubricants for other industries in the
economy.  They can be viewed in a variety of ways in the context of growth accounting.
One simple way is to think of them as another form of intangible capital, so that the growth
of output of a developing country can be seen as:





capital capital  progress
Hong Kong, China 41.81 6.46 1.58 50.14
Republic of Korea 44.54 14.98 1.75 38.73
Singapore 37.01 31.30 1.52 30.17
Taiwan Province of China 43.00 10.46 1.38 45.16
Indonesia 62.79 15.91 5.69 15.61
Malaysia 42.87 33.41 3.25 20.47
Philippines 52.18 41.63 6.23 -0.03
Thailand 51.01 13.32 2.36 33.31
China 86.39 10.37 3.27 0.00
Japan 38.21 2.47 1.17 58.14
Source: Lau and Park, 2003.
6 For more details, see L.J. Lau and J.S. Park, 2003.71
dY/Y = dA/A + a(dK/K) + b(dL/L) + (1-a-b) (dS/S)  (3)
where S is the amount of service output available for production and “b” is the labour
share of national income.  A more subtle way to incorporate service into the aggregate
production function is additionally to allow a separate amount of service-enhanced amount
of  physical  capital  (much  like  human  capital)  in  the  production  function.    With  gradual
liberalization of services over time, the growth rate of the national output increases while
other factors remained constant.  A third way to incorporate service liberalization in the
growth-accounting framework is to assume that service sector liberalization will increase
A, or the level of technology.  While it is necessary to perform the actual empirical work to
see how much services can contribute to development, the important basic conceptual
point is:
Service trade liberalization constitutes an important channel for economic
growth, in addition to investment in education and spending on research
and development.
B.  Political economy of service trade liberalization
If indeed service trade liberalization is a new channel for economic development,
and one that growth accounting may not have taken into account, then why is service
trade liberalization so difficult to achieve?  The basic answer lies in the political economy
aspects of such liberalization.  There has been extensive literature on trade liberalization
associated with WTO.  On liberalization of selective service sectors, many influential and
insightful papers have also been written (Sapir, 1998, Hoekman and Messerlin, 2000, and
Hoekman and Braga, 1997, among others).  However, in terms of theoretical research
work focusing on the political economy of liberalizing trade in services, the literature has
been minimal by comparison.
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This section aims to provide a simple, tractable model of the political economy of
service sector liberalization in order to illustrate some possibilities for research in this area.
The model, while simple, will allow the capture of some of the important stylized features
of the service sector that are often alluded to in the literature (see, for example, Hoekman
and  Messerlin,  2000,  Warner,  2000,  and  Sauve  and  Wilkie,  2000).    Furthermore,  the
model will also permit consideration of the links between the liberalization of a developing
country’s service industry and liberalization in the agricultural sector of industrialized countries.
In addition, it highlights how, despite the fact that liberalizing the service sectors improves
the welfare and growth prospects of the developing countries, political economy considerations
can still hinder economic development.  The model further highlights how multilateral trade
negotiations sponsored by WTO can help the liberalization process.
According to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), there are four
types of trade in services.  Karsenty (2000), and Ito and Krueger (2003) discussed these
modes extensively.  They are:
7 Some recent exceptions include K.C. Fung and A. Siu, 2006, and some related theoretical modelling
work by J. Francois and I. Wooton, 2001.72
(a) Cross-border trade in which services can be produced in one country and
delivered to another economy (for example, banking services that are provided
to foreigners via mail or telephone, which are counted as exports of service);
(b) Trade  in  which  consumption  occurred  abroad,  i.e.,  domestic  residents  go
abroad to consume the products (for example, tourism);
(c) Services provided via foreign direct investment.  That is, sales provided to
foreign nationals by foreign branches and subsidiaries of the home entities
(for example, foreign subsidiaries of insurance companies or hotel chains);
(d) Services are provided by movement of natural persons.  This category includes
people such as consultants, accountants, doctors, etc. moving from the home
country to the foreign country to deliver the services.
In addition, several stylized economic characteristics of the service industries affect
trade liberalization in the sector (see, for example, Feketekuty, 2000, Francois and Wooton,
2001).  This section considers the following aspects:
(a) The  frequent  perception  of  service  trade  barriers  as  qualitatively  different
from  trade  barriers  in  goods.
8 Instead of tariffs and quotas, trade barriers
in  services  are  often  closer  to  regulatory  barriers  (e.g.,  regulations  in
telecommunication) and entry barriers (e.g., restrictions against entry by foreign
banks);
(b) Due to barriers to entry and other inherent economic characteristics, service
industries often exercise various degrees of market power.  In other words,
they are quite often imperfectly competitive;
(c) The use of service industries, and particularly producer services as “lubricants”
for other industries (e.g., in trade-related services, finance, distribution, etc.)
Aspect (c), the intermediate roles of some services, often leads observers to call
on  the  governments  of  the  developing  countries  to  recognize  the  virtues  of  unilateral
liberalization, and to proceed with domestic reforms in the service industries without regard
for global negotiations.  While this is eminently reasonable – and a fair amount of reforms
have actually taken place, particularly in East Asia – it may appear unrealistic, given that
most governments (particularly those of developing countries) will be subject to influences
from special interests.  This section shows that WTO, with its sponsoring of multilateral
trade negotiations, can help relax the political-economic constraints and allow a greater
degree of service sector liberalization.
1.  An illustrative political-economic approach
To start the model, consider an open economy (a developing country) with two
sectors:  a formal sector that is open to international liberalization negotiations and an
8 For attempts to measure trade barriers in the service sectors, see P. Dee and K. Hanslow, 2001.73
informal sector that is not open to trade.  The formal sector comprises three industries –
the service industry, the manufacturing industry and the agricultural business (agribusiness)
industry.  The producer service industry is government-regulated, so trade barriers exist in
the form of entry barriers against foreign affiliates.  The manufacturing industry is also
competing  with  imports.    However,  the  agribusiness  industry  is  producing  for  home
consumption as well as for exports.  An attempt is made here to depict a situation of
a developing economy that may be involved in the Doha Round of trade talks (e.g., Brazil).
It is exporting agricultural products while importing manufacturing goods and services.
The  informal  sector  produces  the  numeraire  good  N  using  mobile  homogenous
labour  only.   The  technology  for  the  numeraire  good  is  constant  return  to  scale.   The
mobile factor is supplied inelastically to the developing country’s economy.  As long as the
informal  sector  is  active,  the  constant  marginal  product  of  the  mobile  factor  fixes  its
economy-wide return to unity.
Total population in the economy is normalized to one.  A fraction α
s of the population
are the owners of capital in the service industry, a fraction  α
m of the population are the
owners of capital the manufacturing industry, and  α
a is the fraction of the population who





individuals are the owners of the mobile factor (labour), which is used in both the formal
and informal sectors, and earn a fixed return normalized to one.  The owners of the mobile
factor are assumed to be politically inactive.  The owners of capital organize as interest
groups for political activities.
The service industry has n identical domestic firms,
9 each producing a homogenous
service output s at a price P
s(S), where S = ns.  Each firm in the industry produces its
service output s with an identical production function f, using capital and the mobile factor
labour.  With the standard properties of the production function,
10 we can generate the dual
cost function C
s, which depends on the quantity of the producer service output s and the
factor prices r and w.
11 As discussed above, one important characteristic of service industries
is that they tend to have market power, so it is assumed that these firms are Cournot-Nash





s (s, w, r)  (4)
It is assumed that these service providers are shielded from foreign competition.
An increase in n will denote foreign entry and a liberalization of service trade.
12
S
n >0  (5)
π
s
n <0  (6)
9 The industry can also be allowed to contain some foreign firms.  The results will not be altered.
10 f is continuous from above, quasi-concave and non-decreasing.
11 The wage rate is actually fixed at one.
12 We have thus focused on a particular mode of service trade, namely trade via the movement of
foreign firms to the domestic market.74
where the subscripts n denotes partial derivatives.
13 A reduction of the trade barriers in the
service industry will thus increase the total volume of services (which, in turn, will reduce
the price of providing the service).  However, foreign entry will also lead to a reduction in
the profits of the incumbent domestic service firms.  Here, the losers from service trade
liberalization (the incumbent service providers in the developing countries) are identified.
Next, we turn to the manufacturing firms and the agribusinesses.  The profit functions










a (a, w, r)  (8)
Note that the price of the service output is used as an input to the manufacturing
industry in equation (7).  This captures a second feature of the service industry, in which
services such as distribution and trade-related services are used as “lubricants” for other
industries.
Next, the political-economy side of the model is developed, which will allow discussion
of  trade  liberalization  in  the  service  industry  in  a  more  realistic  setting.   The  model  is
similar in structure to Grossman and Helpman (1994), Rama and Tabellini (1998), and
Fung and Lin (2001).  To do this, we first turn to the demand side of the economy.  All
individuals in this developing economy are assumed to have the same preferences.  The







where CS = consumer surplus derived from consumption of the manufacturing good and
the agricultural product.  It is assumed that the producer service output is not directly
consumed by individual consumers.
















a is the return to the specific
capital in the agricultural sector and I
w is the fixed return to the mobile factor.
With no lobbying, it is assumed that the policymakers can choose an appropriate
level of n to maximize social welfare.  The government’s objective function is given by:
Max









13 The derivations of these partials are available upon request.
14 It can be assumed that the capital owners in the manufacturing industry are earning rents in an
imperfectly competitive environment and that the capital owners in the agribusiness are owners of the
specific  factor  –  capital  –  in  each  industry.    An  expansion  of  trade  due  to  trade  liberalization  in
European Union or the United States agriculture will allow the capital owners in this industry to earn
a higher real rate of return.75
where W is the social welfare level that can be attained in the absence of any political
contributions to the government.  The socially optimal n is then given by n
w = arg max W.
The  lobbying  structure  follows  the  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994)  framework,
which applies the Bernheim and Whinston (1986) study on menu-auctions and common
agency.    The  various  interest  groups,  as  bidders,  offer  various  contribution  schedules
corresponding to different entry barriers to the government at the first stage.  The government,
as the auctioneer, sets n by evaluating the weighted sum of contributions and aggregate
social welfare at the second stage.  An equilibrium is a set of contribution schedules and
the politically determined number of producer service providers.
The equilibrium contribution schedules imply that the interest groups contribute up
to the point where the marginal benefit from the resulting change in the number of providers
exactly equals to the marginal contribution costs.  In equilibrium, the contribution schedules







where i is the lobby group, λ
i
n (n) is the contribution schedule provided by interest group i.
2.  Lobbying by producer service providers
First, it is assumed that only the producer service providers will lobby to restrict
entry to their own industry.  The government’s objective is to maximize the possibility of
being  re-elected.    With  lobbying,  other  than  providing  a  high  standard  of  living  to  the
public, the government has another resource to enhance its possibility of being re-elected,
i.e., contributions provided by the interest groups.  With lobbying, the government’s objective
function contains not only the aggregate social welfare, but also the total level of political





s(n)] + W (12)
where β
s >1 represents the weight that the government puts on the contributions provided
by the interest groups.
15














w  = 0 (13)
The politically determined number of providers is given as n
p = arg max V
G.  By
totally differentiating equation (16) with respect to n and β (and evaluating β at 1), it is
shown that lobbying by the service providers will lead to entry barriers.
 n
15 β >1 implies that the government values a US dollar offered by the interest groups more than
a US dollar in the hands of the public.
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By  restricting  entry,  the  economic  rents  of  the  incumbent  service  providers  are
increased.  In the context of the Doha Round, it is assumed that the any relaxation of the
entry barriers will lead to entries by foreign firms.  These entry barriers thus constitute
trade barriers.  So far, it has been shown that lobbying by the service providers leads to
trade restrictions in services.
C.  Liberalizing producer service trade restrictions
1.  Cross-cutting lobbying
Given that trade restrictions are the result of explicit lobbying by the insiders of the
service industries, and that the economic rents are captured by these incumbents, what
can be done to try to relax these politically determined trade barriers?  If it is now assumed










  + W (14)
where  β
m >1  is  the  weight  attached  by  policymakers  to  the  contributions  made  by  the















w  = 0 (15)
Essentially, the government places more weight on the interests of the incumbent
service providers as well as the manufacturing capital owners because they provide funds
to the government.  What are the effects of allowing an industry to lobby for the entry and
trade policy in another industry?  That is, what are the effects of allowing cross-cutting
lobbying?  It results can be seen by totally differentiating equation (12) with respect to n
and β
m.  The resulting politically determined number of producer-service providers will be
larger than when only the service providers are allowed to lobby.  Intuitively, this is precisely
because producer services are used as lubricants in other industries.  The manufacturing
capital owners lobby to relax the trade and regulation barriers in order to allow foreign
affiliates to enter the service industry.  With a larger number of providers, the price of the
service output declines, which, in turn, raises the profits of the owners of manufacturing
firms.
In reality, existing regulations in the service industries are often opaque, complex
and  convoluted.    For  example,  information  and  specific  knowledge  about  the  financial
industry or telecommunications industry are difficult to master.  That is why rents in services
are  often  captured  by  insiders.    To  facilitate  cross-cutting  lobbying,  these  regulations
should be made more transparent and consistent.  The process of government policymaking
should also be made more transparent; however, this is not always the case, particularly in
developing economies.  Thus:
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Allowing cross-cutting lobbying by the manufacturing industry will enhance
trade liberalization in the service industry.  In general, more transparency in
policymaking  and  regulations  in  the  service  sector  will  facilitate  service
trade liberalization.
2.  State-owned service providers
In many service industries of developing economies, the provision of services is
often done by state-owned enterprises.  Suppose we assume that θ <n is the number of
incumbent  service  providers  in  the  economy.    Bureaucrats  and  government  ministries
directly own these entities, and the economic profits of the state-owned firms go directly to
the treasury of the government.  Both the government bureaucrats and ministries derive
explicit  and  implicit  income  from  the  state  ownership  of  these  service  providers.   The
















b  = 0 (16)
where V
b is the impact of a relaxation of the trade restriction in the service industry on the
utility of the government bureaucrats in control of the state-owner service providers, and
α
b is  the  fraction  of  the  population  that  comprise  government  bureaucrats  who  control
these state-owned service providers.  By differentiating equation (13) with respect to n and
α
b, we can easily see that reducing the number of government-owned service providers
will lead to a more relaxed policy towards service trade.  The reason is simple:  trade
restrictions allow government bureaucrats to capture some of the economic rents in the
service  industry.    These  rents  are  proportional  to  the  number  of  service  firms  under
government control.  Thus, we have:
Reducing the number of state-owned service providers will enhance trade
liberalization in the service industry.
3.  Multilateral cross-sectoral negotiations
In the literature, there has always been a notion that cross-sectoral negotiations
will enhance liberalizations across the board.  For the current proposed cuts in subsidies
and tariffs in the European Union farm sector, it is clear that these cuts are contingent on
“satisfactory” openings in the service industries in the developing countries.  In our model,
this feature can be seen by incorporating lobbying by the agribusinesses, with the first

















b  = 0 (17)
where  β
a is  the  weight  attached  by  the  policymakers  on  the  contributions  provided  by
farmers  and  t  is  the  farm  tariff  rate  imposed  by  the  European  Union.    Without
cross-sectoral  negotiations,  the  impact  of  liberalizing  the  service  industry  on  domestic
farmers is only through their consumption of the lower-priced manufacturing goods.  With
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specific capital owned by the lobbyists from the domestic farm sector.  By differentiating
equation (14) with regard to n and t, it can be seen that linked negotiations will lead to an
easing of the trade barriers in the service sector.  Thus:
Cross-sectoral negotiations will enhance trade liberalization in the service
sector.    Multilateral  trade  negotiations  sponsored  by  WTO  relax  the
political-economic  constraints  and  can  lead  to  more  liberalization  in  the
service sectors.
D.  Conclusion
Service  trade  liberalization  is  an  important  component  of  the  now  stalled  Doha
Round of multilateral trade talks.  Viewed from the perspective of the literature of Asian
growth  accounting,  we  can  easily  conceptualize  service  liberalization  as  an  additional
important channel for economic development.  While it is true that the East Asian and
Southeast Asian economies need to continue investing in human capital as well as research
and  development,  it  is  also  safe  to  say  that  service  trade  liberalization  can  be
a powerful ingredient in fostering more economic growth.  In order to gauge the quantitative
importance of service trade liberalization for growth rates, actual empirical research needs
to be conducted in this area in the future.
While it is relatively easy to think of service trade liberalization as a positive force
for economic development, it is also not difficult to see that reforms and liberalization in
services have not been sufficient.  To understand such contradictions further, a simple
theoretical  model  has  been  constructed  in  this  chapter  that  depicts  the  various
political-economic facets of trade liberalization in the service sector in the context of the
Doha Round trade talks.  First, a model was built that incorporates three stylized features
of the service sector:
(a) Trade barriers often occur in the form of entry barriers;
(b) Producer service providers are used as lubricants in other industries; and
(c) Service firms often have market power.
To discuss liberalizing the service sector, it is the authors’ opinion that an explicitly
political-economy model along the lines pioneered by Grossman and Helpman is more
appropriate than the depiction of a welfare-maximizing government.  By using this simple
formal model, it has been shown that lobbying by the service providers leads to trade
restrictions in the service industry.
This  model  has  then  been  used  in  discussing  several  interesting  issues  in  the
context of global trade negotiations.  First, allowing cross-industry lobbying (in the sense
of allowing the manufacturing capital owners to lobby for influences in the service industry’s
entry restrictions) will enhance trade liberalization in the service sector.  Next, it was noted
that in many developing economies, service providers are often owned by the State.  By
using this model, it has also been shown that reducing the number of state-owned service79
providers  will  ease  trade  restrictions  in  the  service  industry.    Finally,  the  issue  of
cross-sectoral negotiations has been considered.  Proposed liberalization by the European
Union  and  the  United  States  is  contingent  upon  “satisfactory”  openings  in  the  service
sectors of the developing countries.  This model has shown that such linked negotiations
would indeed lead to greater trade liberalization in the service sector.
It has been argued here that multilateral trade talks sponsored by WTO would help
relax  political-economic  constraints  and  push  service  trade  liberalization  further  along.
Future research will be needed in examining the institutional details of the political-economic
forces in various developing countries in order to develop this line of inquiry.
This chapter has provided a general framework that lays out the theoretical aspects
that would liberate economies from their political constraints and allow developing countries
to engage in service sector liberalization.  Overall, it has been shown that institutions such
as WTO, which will eventually facilitate service sector liberalization, will (at least indirectly)








Structure of the political-economy model
of service trade liberalization




s (s, w, r)  (1)




  = P + sP’ – C
s
  = 0  (2)
d π
s2/d
2 s = π
s
  = 2P’ + sP’’ – C
s
  <0  (3)
For the liberalization experiments that we want to study, we assume that a stable
Nash equilibrium is holding:
D = P’n + sP’’n – C
s
   <0 (4)
K = P’ – C
s
   <0  (5)
These stability conditions are derived formally in Seade (1980).  It is assumed that
these service providers are shielded from foreign competition.  An increase in n will denote
foreign entry and a liberalization of service trade.  Using (1) to (5), it is shown that:
S
n= s(P’ – C
s  )/D >0  (6)
π
s
n= -s(P – C
s
  ) π
s
   /D <0  (7)
where the subscripts n denotes partial derivatives.  A reduction of the trade barriers in the
service industry will thus increase the total volume of services (which, in turn, will reduce
the price of providing the service).  However, foreign entry will also lead to a reduction of
the incumbent domestic service firms’ profits.
Next, turn to the demand side of the economy, all individuals in this developing
economy are assumed to have the same preferences, and they maximize the utility function:
U
i (N, m, a) = N
i + u
i (m, a)  (8)
where i = s, m, a and w (individuals in each of the four groups); N
i is the consumption of
the numeraire good.  The function U(.) is differentiable, increasing and strictly concave in








i is the net income of individual
For all other details of the model, see Fung and Siu (2005).
 I in each group.81
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DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF SERVICES
LIBERALIZATION
By Gloria O. Pasadilla and April Lacson
Fung and Siu (2006) argued that the level of services liberalization could be explained
in the context of a power play between domestic liberal and protectionist forces.  More
specifically,  they  argued  that  the  presence  of  domestic  interest  groups  for  or  against
liberalization  influences  policymakers  through  lobbying  activities  to  pursue  or  block
liberalization of sectors.  Most of their arguments rely on the premise that either domestic
service providers or the manufacturing industries are concentrated enough to allow cooperation
between players in launching an effective lobby.  The problem of collective action is that
no single player, unless deeply invested in the interests of the services sector such as
a state-owned monopoly, will take on the costs of lobbying when the resulting benefits will
accrue to everyone in the industry.
Their model can be one plausible explanation for the slowness of services liberalization
in WTO, but other explanations may hold as well.  Various country experiences (some
examples of which are described below) show that liberalization or continued protection of
services do not occur as a result of lobbying.  The Czech Republic, for example, pursued
liberalization as part of its transition from communism while Turkey liberalized financial
services as part of its structural adjustment programme.  The same holds true for the
experiences  of  other  countries,  where  no  significant  lobbies  or  parliamentary  debates
ruled the day, but through economic restructuring pressure from without.
Especially when it comes to WTO, various concerns colour the negotiations on
services liberalization through GATS.  These include the concern of government officials
over the national ability to cope with a liberalized market, worries over having the necessary
regulatory institution and resources to manage liberalization, uncertainty as regards the
effect  of  liberalization  on  employment  and  domestic  industry  as  well  as  future  policy
flexibility, and inadequacy of data and research on the effects of service liberalization.  Of
course, that concern is somehow related to the prevailing political economy that is partly
explained  by  Fung  and  Siu  (2006),  but  the  model  does  not  completely  determine
a government’s position.
Another reason for the hesitation over liberalization comes from a perception that
services  liberalization  is  primarily  a  developed  country  agenda.    To  some  extent,  the
assumption is valid.  In 2003, developed country share of total world exports of services
was as high as 75.8 per cent (Findlay and Sidorenko, 2005) while developing countries
generally remained net importers (UNCTAD, 2005).  Developed country economies also
rely  more  heavily  on  services  than  developing  countries.   As  much  as  71  per  cent  of
developed  country  GDP  comes  from  services  whereas  for  least  developed  countries,
services only account for about 46 per cent of GDP (Findlay and Sidorenko, 2005).86
Yet, just as trade is not a zero-sum game, neither is services liberalization.  In fact,
estimates suggest that merely halving the amount of protection in the sector promises to
bring an increase in income five times greater than that brought by liberalization in the
trade in goods (World Bank, 2003).  Theoretically, liberalization brings with it a number of
benefits  such  as  “improved  allocative  efficiency,  access  to  superior  technology  and
intermediate  inputs,  greater  variety  of  goods,  advantages  of  economies  of  scale  and
scope, increased domestic competition and creation of growth externalities through knowledge
transfers” (Dornbusch, 1992 in Findlay and Sidorenko, 2005).  Further, Nielson and Taglioni
(2004) argued that because developing countries had more barriers to services trade than
developed ones, gains from liberalization from the sector would be greater for the former
than for the latter.  Finally, while export-related gains may be substantial, they argued that
greater benefits from liberalization would come from increased competitiveness and efficiency
of domestic markets than from acquiring more market access and capturing market share
abroad (Dornbusch, 1992, in Findlay and Sidorenko, 2005).  However, despite the theorized
benefits, developing countries remain hesitant over liberalizing services, especially since,
as far as the Doha Round is concerned, developed countries appear intent on acquiring
concessions on market access for the sector while apparently little progress has been
achieved in agriculture.
Country experiences of services sector liberalization
It is an incontrovertible fact that developed countries have a comparative advantage
in exporting services, because major financial, telecommunication, shipping, air transportation
and other services are mostly owned by businesses headquartered in rich countries.  The
question is whether the opening of the services sector is only one-sided; that is, whether
developing countries do not, themselves, benefit from it.  What are developing country
experiences of liberalization of services?
Although anecdotal in nature, country experiences show that services liberalization
does have its benefits to the liberalizing country itself.  First, lifting restrictions on market
entry allows new players, both foreign and domestic, to challenge existing monopolies and
promote a more competitive environment.  Competition, in turn, spurs efficiency gains as
erstwhile monopolies strive to improve productivity and avoid loss of market share.  New
entrants,  on  the  other  hand,  bring  in  new  investment  and  even  innovations.    Foreign
players, especially those from developed countries, bring in new techniques, knowledge,
processes, and technology that, in turn, compel domestic competitors to adapt or innovate.
This occurred in Argentina when it liberalized its energy sector, in Uganda when it liberalized
its telecoms, and in the Czech Republic, where a general equilibrium analysis showed that
services liberalization had positive downstream cost effects on manufacturing industries
(Arnold and others, 2006).
The mere increase in the number of service providers already provides a benefit to
consumers  in  terms  of  increased  accessibility  of  services,  higher  penetration  rates  for
telecoms and expanded choices for consumers.  In Argentina’s electricity sector and the
Philippines’ airline industry, a drop in the prices together with improvements in the quality87
of  services  even  occurred  as  service  providers  tried  to  outdo  each  other  and  capture
greater market shares.  Privatization and removal of subsidies, on the other hand, add to
the government treasury or, at least, result in a reduction in public subsidies.
The  table  summarizes  selected  country  experiences  in  services  liberalization  in
a variety of sectors.  In all the examples, the service sector, prior to liberalization, was
dominated  either  by  a  monopoly  (usually  state-owned)  or  by  a  small  number  of  large
conglomerates.  In many cases, this led to limited service accessibility, high prices and low
quality.  This was the case for the Philippine air transportation industry before liberalization
when Philippine Airlines (PAL) remained the country’s sole carrier.  As a monopoly, the
company  had  little  incentive  to  improve  services  to  customers,  especially  since  losses
were offset, if not totally covered, by government subsidies.  Consequently, despite the
fact that PAL flights were expensive and frequently late, customers were forced to use
their services.  After liberalization, which involved deregulation and privatization efforts,
five  carriers  entered  the  market  offering  variety,  choice  and  lower  airfares.    The  PAL
administration thus had to shape up, and while PAL airfares were initially 11-34 per cent
higher  than  those  of  local  competitor  Cebu  Pacific,  in  recent  years  a  degree  of  price
convergence has been noticeable (Austria, 2000).
Argentina’s electricity sector experienced a similar broad pattern as the Philippines’
air transportation sector before and after liberalization.  Prior to liberalization efforts, the
electric sector was dominated by large monopolistic conglomerates concentrated across
the different stages of energy creation, transmission and distribution.  Energy transmission
was  inefficient  and  20  per  cent  of  energy  created  was  left  unpaid  for  due  to  illegal
hook-ups.  Prices were high, averaging at US$ 60/MWh, and blackouts were frequent.
After liberalization, foreign entry was allowed and a number of competitors entered the
sector.    Eventually,  the  sector  was  producing  more  than  enough  energy  to  supply  the
entire country and even for exports.  Blackouts were reduced by between 22 and 39 hours
per year to 6 hours per year, while prices were reduced to US$ 27-US$ 28/MWh (Centre
for Energy Economics, undated).
Of course, the amount of benefits depends on a number of factors such as the
extent of liberalization, the safety nets in place and whether the nature of the business
environment is conducive and facilitating or prohibitive (e.g., availability of infrastructure
and the efficiency of government bureaucracy in processing new entrants).  Further, not all
services liberalization leads to a more competitive environment.  In some cases, foreign
players  merely  replace  domestic  monopolies  and  oligopolies  while  collusive  practices
remain (e.g., the cement industry in the Philippines).  Nevertheless, although brief, the
examples above show that, at the very least, services liberalization is not all pain and no
gain.  There are benefits to be had and, in realizing that fact, the question now becomes,
why do countries still obstinately refuse to open up.  Further, given the existence of the
GATS framework, why not open up the services sector through the multilateral negotiations.
Why not GATS?88
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Why not the GATS?
While  unilateral  liberalization  has  its  benefits,  liberalization  through  multilateral
agreements arguably has more advantages.  First, if successful, services liberalization
through GATS would involve reforms across a wide array of services and countries.  The
sheer number of the players involved in the multilateral negotiations alone is enough to
overtake gains from unilateral liberalization.  Commitments made in WTO also give credibility
to state policies.  At the same time, GATS has flexibility provisions that allow countries
greater ability to choose what sectors to liberalize and to what extent.  Multilateral liberalization
is also preferable to regional trade liberalization as trade diversion effects from the latter
may outweigh its trade creation effects, i.e., giving preference to the less efficient service
provider results in wasteful resource allocation and negative externalities to parties outside
the agreement.
However, a look at the number and nature of commitments to GATS shows that
little progress has been made despite the proclaimed advantages of multilateral services
liberalization.  Adlung and Roy (2005) found that, on average, only one-third of all services
sectors of all member countries are committed to GATS; even then, as of 2005, most of
the commitments are limited by exclusions, special arrangements and limitations on market
access and modes of entry.
Since flexibilities in GATS allow member countries considerable leeway in deciding
which sectors to liberalize and to what extent, committing a sector does not necessarily
imply significant liberalization.  In fact, the total ratio of limitations to commitments is 2:2,
suggesting that for every commitment made there are about two limitations accompanying
it (Adlung and Roy, 2005).
One explanation for the lack of progress in negotiations in GATS is that the very
features that make it advantageous also weaken it.  Having many members at the negotiating
table slows down and complicates negotiations while policy lock-in enforced through sanctions
makes the autonomy provided by unilateral liberalization more appealing.  Further, while
the flexibility provisions under Article XIX:  2 of GATS allow members to pace liberalization,
they also encourage countries to slack off and offer limited commitments without substantially
liberalizing the sector.  GATS, for example, does not oblige WTO members to commit
a  specific  number  of  sectors.    In  fact,  a  country  need  only  make  one  commitment  in
a single sector to show its official acceptance of the Uruguay Round (Stephenson, 2001).
Thus,  partly  due  to  this  flexibility,  countries  have  not  committed  more  sectors,  taking
advantage of the leeway provided.
Another perspective involves the political economy of services liberalization.  In
particular, Fung and Siu (2006) argued that the level of services liberalization depended
on a number of factors, particularly the presence of domestic interest groups for or against
liberalization.    They  argued  that  little  or  no  liberalization  occurred  in  the  presence  of
domestic service providers who, they assumed, would naturally lobby against reforms in
the sector.  The existence of state monopolies also hinders liberalization since, like domestic,
non-state service providers, they run the risk of losing market share and facing intense92
competition from new entrants should the country loosen restrictions (Fung and Siu, 2006).
However, as stated above, the absence of liberalization in general and commitment to
GATS in particular, is explained by more than domestic lobbying efforts.
Some developing country policymakers, for example, are worried over government
ability to establish and finance the necessary regulatory institutions to manage and oversee
the  liberalization  of  the  sector.    The  World  Bank  estimates  that  the  establishment  of
a  telecom  regulatory  board  to  oversee  telecom  liberalization  would  cost  about  US$  2
million per year – a sizeable sum for countries such as the Dominican Republic, for which
US$ 2 million already represents 5 per cent of the government budget (World Bank, 2003).
Another concern involves access to services once subsidies are removed.  While
a country may benefit from competition effects and possibly lower prices, the poor may be
unable to provide themselves with these services despite diminished costs (Findlay and
Sidorenko, 2005; World Bank, 2003).  Education and health are two sectors where removal
of government subsidies and possible consequent marginalization of the poor is a crucial
issue, especially since these sectors serve to build and develop a country’s human capital.
Thus, if left without remedy, instead of leading to development, services liberalization may
actually hinder countries from achieving it.  Finally, the common fear that foreign entry may
crowd  out  domestic  service  providers  also  plagues  the  mind  of  developing  country
policymakers,  leading  to  hesitancy  in  committing  more  sectors  than  are  necessary  to
legitimize membership in WTO (UNCTAD, 2005).
Hesitation over making substantial commitments towards GATS may also be explained
by the dearth of economic studies and statistics regarding the area, adding to the paucity
of knowledge about the sector.  Where statistics exist, data may be insufficient or incompatible
with GATS classification.  The GATS framework, for example, does not coincide with those
used by statisticians (Stephenson, 2001).  Countries without the resources to devote to
research are thus hampered by their inability to identify which sectors will benefit from
liberalization and to what extent.  Further, even where a country has sufficient resources to
fund such research, the impact of services liberalization is hard to quantify and establish,
given the difficulty of calculating price equivalents for the sundry list of non-tariff barriers
that plague the sector (Stephenson, 2001).
From  a  negotiator’s  point  of  view,  offering  new  commitments  within  GATS  also
diminishes, if not totally eliminates, policy flexibility.  Uncertain about the effects of liberalization,
governments naturally want the option of reversing policies should opening up the sector
prove disastrous due to excessive competition, a complete rout of small domestic service
providers, a macroeconomic imbalance due to sudden entry of huge investment inflows or
other unintended consequences.
In addition, the nature of the services sector makes liberalizing it more difficult than
liberalizing trade in goods.  The sector is subject to a variety of barriers to trade such as
regulatory and cross-border policies restrictions.  Moreover, whereas an executive order or
decree  may  be  sufficient  to  lower  tariffs  in  goods,  services  liberalization  may  involve
deeper  legislative  and  even  constitutional  amendments  to  change  specific  regulations
(Adlung and Roy, 2005).93
Finally, because of the service sector’s relative novelty, there is a lack of definite
knowledge about which subsectors comprise services and how liberalization could possibly
affect them.  Some members have even added new classifications in their schedule of
commitments.  This multiplicity of definitions makes it difficult to determine what a country
has  committed  (UNCTAD,  2005).    While  GATS  does  have  one  standard  classification,
countries are free to use other classifications as long as they are mentioned in the schedule
of commitments, thus introducing greater complexity to the negotiations and its implementation.
Even when a country decides to commit, the novelty and complexity of services
may lead to disagreements over interpretation of the extent and nature of commitments.
Two  landmark  cases,  both  involving  the  United  States,  serve  to  highlight  the  problem.
These are discussed below.
(a) United States-Antigua and Barbuda online gambling
1
This case involved the small country of Antigua and Barbuda and the United States
over  the  latter  country’s  gambling  measures.   Antigua  and  Barbuda,  a  country  whose
economy thrives on online gambling, claimed that several of the United States’ domestic
laws (i.e., the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling and Business Act) and the
state laws of Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah were inconsistent with the
United States’ commitments to GATS.  In particular, these laws unfairly discriminate against
online  gambling  service  providers  in  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  and  contradict  mode  1
commitments concerning market access (World Trade Organization, undated).
The United States claimed that gambling was not included in its list of commitments
and, further, that the prohibition on online gambling was allowable under the exceptions
provided under GATS Article XIV (a) and (c) to “protect public morals”.  Antigua countered
that when the United States included the liberalization of “other recreational services” in its
schedule,  it  implicitly  included  gambling  based  on  the  United  Nations  Central  Product
Classification (Thayer, 2004).  Clearly, depending on which interpretation is favoured, the
United States either will be guilty of scrimping on its commitments or will be honouring it.
The decision of the Panel favoured Antigua and Barbuda, and it agreed that the
inclusion by the United States of “other recreational activities” did include gambling and,
based on the principle of technological neutrality,
2 also included online gambling.  Further,
the Panel found that the total prohibition of Internet gambling was in violation of Article XVI
of GATS as it was tantamount to imposing a zero quota on foreign service providers.
The subsequent Appellate Body decision still favoured Antigua and Barbuda (World
Trade  Organization,  undated).    Crucially,  though,  the Appellate  Body  differed  with  the
Panel in that it accepted the United States’ defence that the measures under issue were
1 The dispute between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda was the first e-commerce case
to be brought before the WTO dispute settlement body.
2 Technological neutrality was defined as non-discrimination as regards the means of delivery of
service, electronic or otherwise (WTO, undated).94
“necessary to protect public morals” and were thus permissible under Article XIV of GATS.
As a result, the Appellate Body only found the Interstate Horse-racing Act to be in violation
of the United States commitments to GATS.  Despite this, some United States senators
were still dismayed at the finding and reacted against what they perceived was an overstepping
of jurisdiction by WTO, especially since the finding necessarily implied changing domestic
law (Richtel, 2004).  Despite this grievance, the United States did express its willingness
to comply.  However, disagreements have arisen between Antigua and Barbuda and the
United States over whether the United States has indeed substantially complied with the
rulings.  A panel was again established to decide on the issue and its ruling has yet to be
circulated (World Trade Organization, undated).
Thus, apart from the variability in the interpretation of a country’s commitments, the
case  also  emphasizes  the  difficulty  faced  by  a  small  country  in  making  a  large  major
partner comply with rulings when the threat of sanctions and, given the miniscule size of
Antigua and Barbuda, the actual carrying out of the threat cannot compel compliance.
(b) United States-Mexico and telecommunications
3
As in the preceding dispute, the second case also involved the United States, but
this time as a complainant against Mexico’s telecommunication laws.  Under the WTO
Telecommunications Agreement, Mexico had committed to allowing market access and
providing national treatment to foreign service providers of voice telephony, circuit-switched
data transmission services, facsimile services, private leased circuit services, paging services
and cellular phone services.  The only limitation to market access was its provision that
international traffic be routed through a company with a duly authorized concession from
the Secretariat of Communications and Transport (Sherman, 2006).
The United States claimed that Mexico had failed to ensure that the major supplier
with  the  necessary  concession  from  the  Secretariat  of  Communications  and  Transport
provided interconnection on “terms, conditions...and cost-oriented rates that are...reasonable”.
Mexico was also committed to providing “appropriate measures” against anti-competitive
practices  and  the  United  States  claimed  that  the  country  was  unable  to  provide  such
“appropriate measures” to prohibit anti-competitive practices by Telmex, its major telecom
supplier,  and  to  ensure  non-discriminatory  treatment  and  conditions.    Clearly,  several
terms from the agreement was ambiguous and open to interpretation.  Depending on how
one defines “cost-oriented” and “appropriate”, Mexico could either be in violation of, or in
compliance  with  its  GATS  commitments  (Sherman,  2006).    Unable  to  agree,  the  two
parties referred the matter to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Subsequently, the Panel found in favour of the United States.  Telmex, for example,
was found to have imposed rates that were 75 per cent higher than demonstrated costs for
domestic termination.  That, the Panel decided, was clearly not “cost-oriented”.  Further,
under Mexico’s Rules for the Supply of International Long-Distance Services (ILD Rules),
operators were “required to apply a uniform settlement rate” and that this rate was negotiated
3 The dispute between Mexico and the United States was the first case involving services.95
by the supplier with the “greatest share of outgoing calls to a particular country”.  Thus, the
ILD actually compelled Telmex, the major supplier in the country, to engage in anti-competitive
prices that eliminated price competition in the market.  Thus, as to whether Mexico had
initiated  appropriate  measures
4 against  anti-competitive  practices,  the  Panel  found  that
Mexico had failed especially since anti-competitive practices did exist and that the ILD
itself compelled the major supplier, Telmex, to engage in such a practice (Ryan, 2004).  As
a result, Mexico was required to amend or remove several laws found to encourage or
promote anti-competitive and discriminatory practices, particularly the law requiring that
the carrier with the largest proportion of outgoing traffic be the sole negotiator on behalf of
all Mexican service providers for international traffic (Sherman, 2006).
In sum, both cases summarized above serve to highlight how differences in the
interpretation  of  commitments,  and  the  key  terms  in  these  commitments,  can  lead  to
differences  in  the  extent  of  actual  services  liberalization  as  opposed  to  that  promised
under a country’s schedule.  This highlights the necessity of care, assiduous diligence and
specificity during negotiations and the drafting of schedules, so that countries do not end
up either committing sectors they do not wish to liberalize in the first place or liberalizing
sectors beyond the desired extent.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that services liberalization brings numerous advantages, developing
countries  remain  diffident  in  opening  the  sector.    While  individual  country  experiences
show that loosening restrictions in the sector and allowing foreign entry leads to several
benefits,  the  continuing  perception  that  services  liberalization  is  primarily  a  developed
country concern makes developing countries wary of liberalizing.
Not  surprisingly,  GATS  has  posted  little  progress  as  countries  offer  limited
commitments  watered  down  by  numerous  restrictions.    The  lack  of  agreements  over
substantial services liberalization stems from a number of factors.  While, Fung and Siu
(2006) cited the power of lobbying groups to advocate for or against liberalization, other
factors appear to prove more explanatory.  The paucity of data and economic research on
the effects of liberalization on particular services sectors, coupled with the natural complexity
of  the  trade  barriers  involved  and  the  services  sectors  itself,  naturally  make  countries
hesitant  over  committing  sectors  –  even  more  so  since  commitments  to  GATS  brings
sanctions if countries fail to comply.
Further, loss of policy flexibility upon committing to GATS makes unilateral liberalization
more appealing.  Finally, as the United States-Mexico and Antigua and Barbuda-Unites
States cases show, the complexity of the sector easily lends itself to misunderstandings
over the interpretation of country commitments, adding to country concerns should they
find themselves forced to liberalize sectors they never intended to open in the first place.
4 “Appropriate measures” is taken to mean measures that are sufficient to forestall anti-competitive
practices (Ryan, 2004).96
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IMPACTS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT MUST ALSO
BE CONSIDERED
By Yumiko Yamamoto
Although this chapter analyses the impact of service trade liberalization on economic
development, this commentary is focused more on the potential impacts of trade agreements
in services on human development.
This chapter assumes that economic development resulting from trade liberalization
in services will benefit all; owners of the capital in the services, manufacturing industries
and  agricultural  business  as  well  as  the  owners  of  the  mobile  factor  (labour).    Social
welfare in the model can be maximized without much increasing the benefits to labour.
Moreover, the literature so far has not found sufficient supporting evidence that benefits
from  economic  development  will  trickle  down  to  all,  including  marginalized  groups  of
people.
In the case of East Asia, which is discussed in this chapter, the income disparities
among households remain slight compared with other regions, even after rapid economic
growth.  However, this is due to relatively high literacy rates supported by a universal
educational system and the development of other social services that are not yet available
in many parts of the Asia-Pacific region.
Benefits from economic development (e.g., GDP growth) are unlikely to be shared
by the poor.  In fact, trade liberalization in services has the potential to worsen people’s
well-being (human development) for the following reasons:
(a) The chapter focuses on the analysis of the service sectors, such as finance
distribution  logistics,  which  are  used  as  “lubricants”  for  other  industries.
However, the direct beneficiaries from liberalization in these sectors are the
owners of the capital in services, manufacturing and agricultural businesses
but not labourers, and especially the marginalized groups of the populations
in developing countries.
As the authors point out, these sectors are trade-related service sectors;
therefore, the majority of the populations in LDCs and low-income developing
countries  do  not  have  access  to  such  services.    In  the  financial  sector,
low-income household members do not have bank accounts.  They mainly
use public transportation or transportation provided by unorganized workers,
such as three-wheelers.  Therefore, trade liberalization in industry-centred
businesses has little positive impacts on human development.
(b) The  General Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS)  and  bilateral  trade
agreements do not limit negotiation coverage to particular sectors in services.99
This  also  includes  human  development-sensitive  sectors  such  as  health,
education, sanitation and utilities (e.g., water).
An analysis of mode 3 in Asia, in a forthcoming UNDP publication, has
found that newly acceded countries, some of them LDCs, have been obliged
to accept much more stringent commitments in their terms of accession to
WTO, sometimes in human development-sensitive sectors such as health,
education and environmental services.
1
Trade liberalization in the areas of health services, education and water supply is
likely to worsen human development – especially in the case of the well-being of women
and  their  families  –  by  decreasing  access  by  the  poor  to  such  social  services  within/
between nations.  For example, Latin American and African experiences have shown that
the  liberalization  of  water  supply  (with  foreign  investment)  leads  to  the  introduction  of
expensive service fees.  As a result, poor communities in those regions have not received
affordable supplies of potable water and the well-being of people in low-income households
is deteriorating further.  Moreover, they have to walk further to fetch “free” potable water
from wells, thus increasing the time spent on unpaid domestic work – a burden that tends
to be borne by women and children.
In conclusion, it is hoped that the authors will subsequently (a) capture the distributional
effects of gains from trade liberalization in services, and (b) suggest specific policies for
compensating the losers in the liberalization of services and/or ensure equal opportunities
for people to gain access to such services.
1 P. Ortega, forthcoming, “Policy Space and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS):
Analysis of WTO Commitments by Asian Countries on Commercial Presence (Mode 3)” Discussion
Paper.  Colombo:  UNDP RCC.